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Abstract
qhe objective of this studyI is to examine the issue of the assessment of the credibility of management
disclosures about a company from the perspective  of the investorsK ft presents the results from a
questionnaire survey  of a sample of financial AnalystsI accountants and other investorK qhe data were
analyzed using the one way analysis of variance EAklsAFK qhe study found that management  situational
incentivesI internal and external assurance and other characteristics of the disclosure itselfI were the
factors investors considered to affect the credibility of management aisclosuresK qhe study recommends
that investors should take these factors  into consideration when assessing management disclosuresK qhe
study also recommends that management should also take these factors into consideration when
preparing their disclosures if they want to improve on their credibilityK
heywords: fnvestorsI Assessment I aisclosures I Management
fntroduction
Management disclosures are valuable source of
information for investorsK qhey play an important
role in alleviating the problem of information
asymmetry between managers and owners
EshareholdersF of a companyK qhey are the means
by which managers communicate information
about the company’s past and future prospects to
present and future investorsK Corporate or
management disclosures are also an aid to the
capital market in the pricing of securitiesK eowever
for any disclosure to be useful and usedI it must be
credible or believableK gennings E19UTF notes that
investors reactions to a management disclosure are
a function of both the new information E“surprise”F
contained in the disclosure and the credibility
EbelievabilityF of the disclosureK According to himI
a disclosure’s credibility may be as important as
the amount of new information in explaining
investors’ reactionK
Managers face a number of institutional penalties
for issuing inaccurate disclosure including loss of
reputationI possible employment penaltiesI and
potential legal action EAdamsI OMMOFK According to
MckicholsE19U9F and  crankel et alE199RF such
reasons haveI in the pastI were sufficientI in
general to deter management from issuing
intentionally biased  disclosures KBut according to
Adams EOMMOFI the effectiveness of such penalties
is based upon the assumption that firmsI investorsI
financial intermediariesI and security regulators
interact on a recurring basis in which market
participants and security regulators can punish
managers in the future for inaccurate disclosures
made in this presentK eowever recent eventsI like
the collapse of bnovn and torld comI have shown
that penalties as enumerated above have not
deterred managers from inaccurate disclosuresK
qhis has heightened investors concerns about the
credibility of management disclosures EBanetI
OMMOFK qhis hasI also heightened the necessity of
having appropriate mechanisms for assessing
management disclosuresK
qhe objectiveof this study thereforeI  is to examine
the issue of assessment of the credibility of
management disclosures by investorsK
iiterature review and hypotheses development
qhe credibility of management disclosures is so
important that there have been many research into
the phenomenonK According to Molly EOMM4FI
literature Mn disclosure credibility is expansive and
diverseK Although many existing studies appear
unrelated on the surface theyI howeverI address
similar theoretical issues K fn other wordsI not
many research have directly addressed the issue of
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investor assessment of the creditability of
management disclosuresK
Before looking at the factors that affect the
credibility of management disclosuresI we will
examine the meaning of disclosure credibilityK
According to Molly EOMM4FI disclosure credibility
is investors’ perceptions of the believability of a
particular disclosureK According to him two
elements of this definition should be highlightedK
cirstI disclosure credibility refers a perception held
by investors not an objective condition of a
disclosureK ee stated that the second part of the
definition presumes that investors appraise the
credibility of the particular management
disclosureK According to gennings E19UTFI when
investors initially receive a disclosure from
managementI they are unaware of the disclosures
actual reliability or quality and will base their
reactions on its perceived credibilityK
aisclosure credibility is sometimes confused with
management credibilityK But the concepts are not
exactly the sameK According to Molly EOMM4FI
disclosure credibility is appraised separately for
each disclosure and may vary within a firm across
different disclosuresK ln the other handI
management credibility is a more enduring trait of
a firm’s managersI referring to investors enduring
trait of a company’s trustworthiness EMollyI OMM4FK
Management credibility is only a factor in the
credibility of management disclosuresK
According to Molley EOMM4FI empirical studies on
disclosure credibility tend to use either archival or
experimental dataK According to him most archival
studies use stock market reactions and/or analysts
forecast revisions to asses a disclosure credibilityK
ln the other handI experimental studies measure
disclosure’s creditability on a numerical scale or
by inferring credibility effects from participants
use of management of disclosures in other tasksK
purvey of investors opinions on factors affecting
disclosure creditability has not been given much
attention in the literature and that is why it is
considered appropriate now to use the method of
this study particularly in a developing country like
kigeria where there is a dearth secondary b of dataK
sarious factors have been identified in the
literature as affecting the creditability of
management disclosureK Molly EOMM4F summarized
these factors to include: E1Fpituational incentives
as at the time of the disclosure;EOF Management
credibility; EPFqhe degree of external
assuranceIE4Fqhe level of internal
assurance;ERFsarious characteristics of the
disclosure like disclosure precision ESFqime
horizon of the disclosureIETFAvailability of support
information EUFfnherent plausibility of the
disclosure;
pituational incentives
ft is generally believed that the situation of a
company at the time of disclosure plays a
fundamental role in determining the credibility of
the disclosureK According to helley E19TOFI people
attribute messages consistent with the source’s
incentives to those incentivesI rather than the
sources true beliefK ConverselyI people tend to
infer that messages inconsistent with the sources
incentives reflect the sources underlying beliefsK
qhese differences suggest that people are less
likely to believe messages that are consistent with
the source’s incentivesK
According to Molley EOMM4FI investors are less
likely to believe management disclosures when
management has high incentives to be misleading
or untruthfulK pome research have been conducted
into the effects of incentive to mislead by
comparing the credibility of good news and bad
newsK According to Mckichols E19U9FI managers
tend to have greater incentives to provide overly
positive disclosures than overly negative
disclosuresK fn other words bad news disclosures
are more credible than good news Kqhis position is
supportd by other studiesK cor exampleI eassel et
al E19UUF and tilliam E199SF found that there is a
positive relationship between management
disclosures containing bad news and larger
analysts forecast revisionsK fn the same veinI
Cairney and oichardson E1999F and eutton et al
EOMMPF established a positive relationship between
management disclosures containing bad news and
larger stock price reactionsK
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hoch EOMMOF examines the effectives of situational
incentives by comparing the disclosure credibility
of financially distressed and non – distressed
companies and found that management has greater
incentives to provide misleading disclosures when
a firm is financially distressedK According to himI
management earnings forecasts made by
financially distressed firm’s exhibit greater up
word bias than management earnings forecasts
made by non-financially distressed firmsK Esee also
crostI 199TFK qhus in summary the credibility of a
management disclosure depends on the existing
situational incentives at the time of the disclosureK
eence we hypothesize that; e1 Managementdisclosure credibility is related to situational
incentives existing at the time of the disclosure
Management credibility
According to Brinbaum and ptegner E19T9F the
credibility of any message isI in partI a function of
its sourceK eoweverI management credibility is
only one of the factors and other variables also
have significant effects on message credibility
Emetty and tegenerI 199UFK According to tilliam
E199SFI the size of analysts forecasts revisions for
subsequent management earnings forecasts are a
function of management forecasts prior accuracy
using exponential testsI eirst et al E1999F found
that investors rely more on management
disclosures when management provided accurate
forecasts in earlier time periodsK qhe foregoing
lead us to the hypothesis that; eO Managementdisclosure creditability is positively related to
management credibilityK
ievel of external assurance
qhe credibility of management disclosure increase
with the level of external assuranceK bxternal
assurance can be provided by auditorsI financial
analystsI regulators and institutional investorsI
among othersK peveral studies have fund that
audited disclosures are more credible than
unaudited disclosures iibby E19T9F finds that
audited disclosure are more credible than
unaudited disclosures Esee also eodgeI OMM1FK
ieftwich E19UPF and Blackwell et al E199UF  find
that external assurance from auditors increases
disclosure credibilityK qhese studies find that
bankers believe that audits enhance the credibility
of financial statementsK
cinancial analysts reactions to a management
disclosure can also affect investors assessment of
the disclosures credibility EdogoiI OMM1; iiI OMMOFK
According to Molley EOMM4F evidence that analyst
reactions to management disclosures affect
investors reactions to those disclosuresI is as yetI
largely anecdotal other factors on external
assurance that could affect a disclosure’s
credibility are the level of regulatory control in the
particular industryI size and nature of the company
and ownership by large institutional investors and
analystsK te therefore hypothesize as follows; eP:Management disclosure credibility is positively
correlated with the level of external assuranceK
ievel of internal assurance
fnternal assurance involve essentially the corporate
governance mechanisms in place that compel
managers adherence to governance principlesK cox
E1999F proposes a hitherto unrecognized effect of
enforced disclosure policies by arguing that
required disclosure helps shareholders enforce
manager’s fiduciary dutiesK According to himI
other than the direct impact of making managers
accountable for their publicly available decisionsI
enforced disclosures also directly affects corporate
governance by affecting the market for corporate
controlI the cost of capitalI and monitoring by
external sources of financeK
According to Molley EOMM4FI investors may feel
more confidence in the veracity of a firm’s
disclosures when the firm has a high quality board
of directorsK Basely E199SF found that firms with
more independent boards and audit committees as
measured by the number of outside membersI
experience less earnings management and fraudK
Esee also hleinI1999FK uie et al EOMMPF also find
that firms in whose boards and audit committees
meet more frequently and have greater financial
expertise experience less  earnings managementK
Black et al EOMMPF find that firms with a large
percentage of outside directors and or an audit
committeeI command higher market valuationsI
and value the earning stream more highly for such
firmsK
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Another source of internal assurance is the internal
audit functionK According to MolleyEOMM4FI
internal auditors often serve as the first line of
defense against disclosure errors  ferreting out
unintentional errors caused by weakness in a
company’s internal controls and intentional errors
due to fraudK As a resultI if investors can assess
internal audit qualityI then companies with   strong
internal audit departments may have higher
disclosure credibilityK qhus the level of internal
assurance can affect management disclosure
credibilityK qhis takes us to the next hypothesisK e4
: qhere is a positive relationship between
management disclosure credibility and the level of
internal assuranceK
aisclosure precision and time horizon
aisclosure precision and time horizon are some
attributes or characteristics of the disclosure itself
that may affect the credibility of the particular
disclosureK According to Molley EOMM4FI
management disclosures vary in their degree of
precisionK ft has been argued that imprecise
disclosures signal managements uncertainty and
are therefore regarded as being less credible than
more precise disclosures Eeassel et alI 19UU; hing
et al 199MFK
AlsoI it has been argued that time horizon covered
by a disclosure affect its credibilityK fn this
connectionI it has been asserted that  short horizon
disclosure such as interim earnings forecast are
generally more credible than longer horizon
disclosures such as annual earnings forecastsK qhis
is based on the assumption that information about
immediate outcomes are more certain than these
about later outcomesK qhis was established by
mownal et al E199PF when they show that interim
management earnings forecasts generate larger
stock price reactions than annual management
earnings forecastK qhus we hypothesis that:
eR: aisclosure   credibility is related to
disclosure precision and time horizonK
pupport information and inherent plausibility
rsually companies provide supplementary
information or explanations to support their
disclosuresK ft has been asserted that
supplementary information add to the credibility of
disclosures by managementK  dorgler E1994F
argues that disclosure decisions often reflect a
tension between providing investors with share
relevant information and providing competitors
with proprietary informationK According to himI
disclosures proprietary information is costly and
therefore has a value which translate into investors
perception of a greater credibility of the disclosure
so supportedK eutton et al EOMMPF note that
supplementary statements should increase
disclosure credibility because these statements
increase the ex-post verifiability of the disclosureK
fn other wordsI managers reduce their ability to
take subsequent opportunistic actions to realize
forecasts or to rationalize unexpected results when
they make specific statements about forecast
componentsK
fnvestors usually have expectations about certain
outcomes and they are more skeptical about any
information that deviates from thisK  pcientists’
judgments are influenced by their prior beliefs
when a research paper’s conclusions disagree with
a scientist’s prior beliefsI he rates the study study’s
methodology to be relatively lower in qualityK
According to Molley EOMM4FI when this applied to
financial disclosuresI a disclosure that deviates
from significantly from investors’ expectations
will be less credible than one that does notK qhus
we hypothesis that;  eS: Management disclosure
credibility is related to the availability of support
information and the inherent plausibility of the
disclosureK
oesearch method
qhe research is a structured cross – sectional
survey of 1RM respondents in bdo stateK qhe
research is on fnvestors Assessment of the
Creditability of Management aisclosures in
kigeriaI but due to resource constraints and the
practical difficulty in accessing every respondent
in kigeriaI the study was limited to bdo ptateI
which is considered a fair representation of the
whole country on issues of investment in the
capital and money marketK qhe respondents were
drawn from among investors potential  investors
and their advisers in bdo stateK qhey were
classified into three groups viz EaF Bank portfolio
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managersI EbF financial Advisers and EcF fndividual
investorsK qhe bank mortfolio Managers were
selected from banks located in bdo ptate to serve
as a proxy for institutional investorsK  cinancial
advisers were collected from among chartered
Accountants and stockbrokers in bdo ptateK lther
investors were collected from among individual
investors and potential investorsK
qhe five point iinkert scale was used in the design
of the questionnaireI which was the research
instrumentK qhe scale was constructed by
assembling a number of statements about factors
used in assessing the credibility of management
disclosuresK qhe respondents were asked to
indicates whether they strongly agreeI agreeI
undecidedI disagree or strongly disagree with each
of the sames of statementK qhe questionnaire
consist of two partsK mart f contain questions on
information about the respondents for the purpose
of respondent classificationK mart f consist of OP
questions under six ESF sections EappendixFKqhe
one – way analysis of variance EAklsAF was
used as the inferential statisticsK
oesults
auring the data gathering exerciseI a total of 1RM
questionnaires were administered to the three
groupsI with each group receiving RM
questionnairesK qable 1 below shows the
distribution of the questionnaires and the response
rates of the various groupsK
qable 1 nuestionnaire aistribution
oespondents koK of
nuestionnaires
administered of
koK of
nuestionnaires
oeturned
oesponse oate
E%F
fndividual fnvestors RM OT R4KMM
Bank mortfolio Managers RM OM 4MKMM
cinancial Analysts RM PM SMKMM
qotal 1RM TT R1KPP
fn order to avoid group dominance in the result of
the researchI equal number of respondents was
selected from the various groupsK qhe minimum
response of OM from the bank portfolio managers
group was used as the reference datum for
selecting the other two groups for analysisK qhe
questionnaires consequently analyzed are shown in
qable O bellowK
qable O nuestionnaires Analyzed
oespondents ko of
nuestionnaires
oeceived
ko of
nuestionnaires
Analyzed
ko of
nuestionnaires
rejected
%of
nuestionnaires
Analyzed
fndividual fnvestors OT OM T T4KMT
Bank mortfolio
Managers
OM OM - 1MMKMM
cinancial Analysts PM OM 1M SSKST
qotal TT SM OT TTK9O
qhe demographic Characteristics of the respondents where responses were analyzed are shown in qable PK
qable P aemographic Characteristics of oespondents
Adb cobnrbkCv mboCbkqAdb
O1-PMyears U 1PKPP
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P1-4Myears PM RMKMM
41-RMyears 1O OMKMM
R1 years and above 1M 1SKST
qotal SMKMM 1MMKMM
dbkabo
Male 4R TRKMM
cemale 1R ORKMM
qotal SMKMM 1MMKMM
vbAop tlohba
rnder R years S 1MKMM
MS-llyears 1O OMKMM
11-1Ryears 1S OSKSS
1S-OMyears 1M 1SKST
O1-ORyears 1M 1SKST
OR years and above S 1MKMM
qotal SM 1MMKMM
aescriptive statistics and test of hypotheses
qable 4 shows the while qable R shows a summary of the result of the hypotheses testing
qable4 aescriptive ptatistics
pituational
incentives
Management
credibility
bxternal
assurance
fnternal
Assurance
aisclosure
precision
pupport
information
Mean PK9O PKUR PK94 4KMO PK9S 4KMP
Median 4KMM 4KMM PK9O 4KMM 4KMM 4K1P
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Mode 4KMM PKRM PKSTa 4KMM 4KMM 4KORa
ptdK aeviation KSO KTSS KRRT K4PR KTRR K4T
sariance KP9 KRUT KP1M K1U9 KRTM KO1S
aK Multiple modes existK qhe smallest value is shown
qable R eypotheses testing
pum of
pquares df Mean pquare c pigK
e1 Between droups 4K4R9 O OKOPM SK949 KMMO
tithin droups 1UKOU9 RT KPO1
qotal OOKT4U R9
eO Between droups SK1MM O PKMRM SKMU9 KMM4
tithin droups OUKRRM RT KRM1
qotal P4KSRM R9
eP Between droups PKT1O O 1KURS TKO4R KMMO
tithin droups 14KSMP RT KORS
qotal 1UKP1R R9
e4 Between droups 1KSOP O KU1O 4KU4P KM11
tithin droups 9KRRP RT K1SU
qotal 11K1TS R9
eR Between droups 4KSRU O OKPO9 4KRUM KM14
tithin droups OUK9UU RT KRM9
qotal PPKS4S R9
eS Between droups 1KROT O KTS4 PKUT4 KMOS
tithin droups 11KOP4 RT K19T
qotal 1OKTS1 R9
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pituational incentives
e1: management disclosure credibility is related tosituational incentivesK qhe mean of the responses is
PK9O with a standard deviation of MKSOKK qhe
hypothesis was tested and the result shows a
calculated value of c=SK949 which is greater than
the critical value of PK1R  qhe hypothesis is thus
acceptedK
Management credibility
eO: there is a positive relationship between the
credibility of management disclosure and
management credibilityK qhe result of the
hypothesis testing  shows a calculated value of
c=SKMU9 which is higher than the table value of
c=PK1R K qhe hypothesis is thus accepted
ievel of external assurance
eP: there  is a positive  relationship between thecredibility of management disclosure and the level
of external assuranceK qhe mean of the responses is
PK94 with a standard deviation of MKRSK qhe
hypothesis testing yields a  calculated value of
c=TKO4R which is higher than the table value of
c=PK1R hence the hypothesis is acceptedK
ievel of internal assurance
e4: there is a positive relationship between thecredibility of management disclosure and the level
of internal assuranceKKqhe mean of the responses is
4KMO with a standard deviation of MK44K qhe
hypotheses results show a calculated value of
c=4KU4P which is greater than the table value of
PK1RI hence the hypothesis is acceptedK
aisclosure precision and time horizon
eR: there is a positive relationship between the
credibility of management disclosure and the
disclosure precision and time horizonK qhe mean
response for the variable is PK9S with a standard
deviation of MKTSK qhe calculated value of c=RKRUM
from the hypothesis testing is higher than the
critical value of c=PK1R qhe hypothesis was
therefore acceptedK
pupport information
eS : the is a positive relationship between the
credibility of management disclosure and
availability of support information and inherent
plausibilityK qhe mean response is 4KMP with a
standard deviation of MKOOK qhe results show a
calculated value of c= PKUT1 which is higher than
the table value of PK1R KqhusI the hypothesis is
acceptedK
pummary of findings
qhe study was out to examine how investors assess
the credibility of management disclosuresK crom
the study the following findings are made:E1Fqhe
situational incentives at time of disclosure affect
the credibility of the disclosureI EOFff a
management is credible or has good reputationI
investors would place high premium on the
credibility of disclosures made by the management
EPFfnvestors would give high credibility to
management disclosures of companies where there
is a high level of external and internal assurance
E4FCharacteristics of the information itself like
availability of support informationI time horizon
inherent plausibility etc affects investors
assessment of the credibility of management
disclosuresK
aiscussion of findings
fn this sectionI we examine the implication of the
findings for the issues raised on the investors
assessment of the credibility of management
disclosuresK qhe results show that respondents
believe that situational incentives affect investors
assessment of the credibility of management
disclosureK Bad news is disclosed in financial
statements are more credible than good news
disclosureK Bad news has negative effect on a
companyI and management is usually not ready to
disclosure bad news except it becomes imperativeK
qhus when bad news is disclosedI it is most likely
to be credibleK Also financially distressed
companies are desperate to hide  their true state
from the outside worldK qhey are therefore not
likely to give credible disclosuresK fnvariably
disclosure credibility should be tied to
management credibilityK ff a manager is credible he
is expected to give true disclosures otherwiseI he is
no longer credibleK Management credibility is
evidence  from past recordsI and one of the best
evidence in this regard is the past  credibility of
disclosure  made by the managerK eence
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management disclosure credibility is affected by
management credibilityK qhis finding is line with
earlier findings  of MckicholsE 19U9FI
helleyE19TOFI and hochE1999FK
qhe results have also indicated that the level of
external assurance affect the credibility of
management disclosureK bxternal assurance is a
measure of the level of monitoring of the
companies affairs of operationsK puch assurance is
provided by auditorsI regulatorsI financial analysts
and institutional investorsK qhe activities of these
external agents gives some  form of assurance that
proper processes are being followed by the
companyK qhis inspire the confidence of the
investor in the  disclosures made by such
companiesKqhe finding on level of external
assurance is consistent with the findings of
iibbyE19T9FI eodgeEOMM1FI ieftwichE19UPFI
Blackwell et aE199UFI dogoiEOMM1FI and iiEOMMOFK
fnternal assurance play a similar role in the
assessment of  the credibility of management
disclosureK Agents of internal assurance include
board of director audit committee and internal
audit departmentK qhe quality and expertise of
these internal assurance agents is critical to the
existence of a good corporate governance
frameworkK qhe  finding of the study  for  internal
assurance  is consistent with existing literature
EuieI et alI OMMP; BeasleyI 199S; tildI 199S;
hleinI1999; coxI 1999FK
qhe findings of the study has further shown that
management credibility disclosure is a function of
characteristics of the disclosure itself like the level
of precision of the disclosureI whether the
disclosure is for the short term Eshort horizonF or
the long term Elong-horizonFI the availability of
support information and the inherent plausibility of
the disclosureK qhese findings are consistent with
most pieces of findings in the literature such as
eassel et alE19UUFI hing et alE199MFI and mownalI
et alE199PF for disclosure precision and time
horizon; and dorglerE1994FI euttonI et alEOMMPF
forsupport information and inherent plausibilityK
qhe study did not examine interactive effects of the
various factorsK qhis should be a subject for further
investigationK
Conclusions and recommendations
qhe current study contributes   to the established
literature addressing factors affecting investors
assessment of the credibility of management
disclosuresK qhe study is considered unique at
least in kigeria in that it consider the factors
affecting investor assessment of the credibility of
management disclosures directly from the
perspective of the investors using primary dataK
lther studies before it have examined some
aspects of the issues using mainly secondary dataK
qhere is no doubt that the assessment of the
credibility of management disclosures will
continue to be of interest in kigeriaI just like in
other countries of the worldK
qhis study will therefore be of particular interest to
management of companies who want to improve
on the credibility of their disclosuresK qhis study
has confirmed to them the factor that investor take
into consideration when assessing management
disclosuresK qhe study will also be useful relevant
to investors and potential investorI analysts other
uses of financial statement who have reasons to
assess the credibility of management disclosuresK
qhe study will also be of importance to
professional bodies regulators and policy makers
who are involved in regulating management
disclosuresK
qhe following recommendations are made for
organisations who desire a fair assessment of their
management disclosures: E1F qhey should ensure
that they retain credible managersI EOF qhey should
endeavour to provide both external and internal
assurance for their disclosuresI EPF qhey should
ensure that adequae corporate governance
structures are put in placeKE4F bstimates disclosed
by the mangement should be as precise as
possibleIE4Fthen making forecastsI short term
horizon elements should be incorporated as much
as possibleI ERFqhey should provide adequate
support information to accompany management
disclosuresI and ESF qhey  should enrich their
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shareholders profile by incorporating large
institutional investorsK
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